At no point since the eruption of the US-Israel-Iran war on 28 February have the prospects for a diplomatic breakthrough been as bright as they are now.
Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that Washington and Tehran will reach a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in the upcoming period.
The ceasefire is extremely fragile, as underscored by the recent US military strikes on southern Iran, and a resumption of full-scale war could take place at any moment.
Moreover, there are sticking points that remain huge stumbling blocks to any agreement, and, perhaps most importantly, the negotiations take place in an environment of deep mistrust.
Although the Trump administration seeks to present a potential new accord as one which would be significantly superior to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), realistically, any new deal would probably ultimately resemble the 2015 deal that Trump himself sabotaged.
Trump’s ‘original sin’ and how we got here
Understanding the current crisis requires taking stock of the first Trump administration’s decision to unilaterally pull the US out of the JCPOA in May 2018.
That reckless move fundamentally reshaped the trajectory of relations between Washington and Tehran while dismantling a framework that severely limited and reversed Tehran’s activities in exchange for sanctions relief.
“The truth is that Trump’s obsession with Barack Obama – his jealousy, his relentless need to engage in Obama-bashing – has led him to depict JCPOA as the worst deal ever, whereas today he’s far from having obtained even ten percent of the concessions that Obama had obtained in 2015,” explained Dr Karim Emile Bitar, a lecturer in Middle East Studies at Sciences Po Paris, in an interview with The New Arab.
Under the JCPOA, Iran dramatically reduced its enriched uranium stockpile, capped enrichment levels, reduced the number of centrifuges, and accepted intrusive international inspections, noted Dr Bitar, who added that even many Israeli security officials privately acknowledged that such restrictions had delayed Iran’s path toward a nuclear weapon.
“So far, I do not see any major Iranian concessions on the nuclear dossier. So obviously we can criticise the JCPOA because there was no linkage [to] the proxies or the ballistic missiles,” Bitar added.
“But when it came to the nuclear file, it was rock solid, and even members of the Israeli military and security establishment acknowledged that it prevented Iran from getting nuclear weapons. So, this entire war…comes from the original sin: Trump’s unilateral decision to tear up the JCPOA in 2018.”
Despite the JCPOA’s critics spending years depicting the accord as dangerously weak, any future agreement will likely preserve many of the same core principles, particularly Iran’s continued right to limited uranium enrichment.
In this sense, Washington may ultimately find itself negotiating a return, however politically repackaged, to many of the realities embedded in the very accord that Trump has spent years condemning as the “worst deal ever.”
The core nuclear dispute
A major obstacle to an agreement remains unresolved disputes over Tehran’s nuclear program. The two sides have yet to agree on how much uranium Iran may enrich, what inspections Tehran will accept, and the scope of sanctions relief.
The Trump administration’s long-standing demand for “zero enrichment” has become increasingly unrealistic, particularly after years of Iran expanding its nuclear capabilities following the JCPOA’s demise.
“If we were to summarise the JCPOA in one sentence, it would be: granting Iran the ‘right to enrich uranium’ and recognising that right. All other issues in the JCPOA are secondary to the principle of the ‘right to enrichment,’” Dr Javad Heiran-Nia, director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran, told TNA.
“In contrast, Trump had declared that Iran’s nuclear program – and its most important part, uranium enrichment – must be dismantled, meaning no centrifuges in Iran that enrich uranium at all – in other words, ‘zero enrichment.’ That is, the US, considering Israel’s red line, insisted on ‘zero enrichment.’ However, what is evident from the interim agreement is that Iran has managed to preserve its right to enrichment,” he added.
“The question of how long Iran will suspend enrichment is secondary. Therefore, it cannot be said that a significant difference will be achieved in Trump’s agreement with Iran regarding the nuclear issue. Furthermore, regarding the stockpile of highly enriched uranium, Iran has not agreed to the US demand, and we have witnessed Trump’s retreat on this issue.”
Disputes also persist over Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium, with proposals ranging from dilution inside Iran under international supervision to transfer abroad.
Equally contentious is the question of sanctions relief and frozen Iranian assets, as Tehran insists that any concessions must be matched by immediate and tangible economic benefits rather than promises that Washington could later reverse.
The trust deficit
Even if diplomacy triumphs, major trust deficits will continue to shape US-Iran talks, especially given that the US-Israeli alliance attacked Iran amid ongoing negotiations taking place in June 2025 and February 2026. This is to say nothing about Trump 1.0 sabotaging the JCPOA in 2018 despite Tehran’s compliance with the agreement at that time.
Tehran suspects that Washington could be negotiating in bad faith, using talks as a means of catching the Islamic Republic off guard. Compounding the problem is the absence of a coherent and stable American negotiating position, with contradictory public statements and shifting demands making it difficult for Iran, or even US allies, to determine Washington’s long-term intentions.
“The problem is the unrealistic American self-perception in terms of its own strength. This self-perception does not take the actual development of the war into account. Therefore, believing itself to be as unquestionably strong as it was before the war, the American position demands something very close to unconditional surrender from Iran,” Dr Rouzbeh Parsi, an affiliated researcher at Lund University, told TNA.
“In addition, not having a clear bureaucratic process and a negotiating position that remains steadfast means that no one really knows what the Americans want and then [at any] given point in time we’re making them even more unreliable than we all already think that they are,” he added.
While indirect talks mediated by Pakistan, Oman, Qatar, and other regional actors have kept diplomacy alive, without some restoration of confidence and predictability, any agreement reached may remain vulnerable to collapse almost as soon as it is signed.
Iran’s post-war leverage
Despite suffering extensive military and economic damage, Iran has emerged from this war with greater leverage than many American policymakers were expecting at the outset of Operation Epic Fury.
Much of the Islamic Republic’s leverage now centres on the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran’s ability to disrupt shipping traffic and raise global energy prices has become a powerful deterrent against further escalation.
This war evolved into a contest of leverage rather than a straightforward military confrontation, with Iran compensating for conventional military disadvantages through asymmetric pressure, maritime coercion, and the threat of regional and international escalation.
The war appears to have reinforced a broader Iranian belief that endurance itself can generate political gains. In short, despite international pressure, sanctions, and sustained military operations, Tehran preserved its negotiating position, retained elements of its nuclear infrastructure, and demonstrated an ability to impose high economic costs on both the United States and its regional allies.
Israel, the spoiler
Israel is the actor most likely to resist or actively undermine a renewed US-Iran agreement. Tel Aviv views any arrangement allowing Tehran to retain enrichment capabilities or regional influence as a threat, regardless of the restrictions imposed on Tehran’s nuclear activities.
Israeli officials fear a stable diplomatic framework could reduce international pressure on Iran while simultaneously strengthening Tehran’s legitimacy and economic resilience. Israel will likely attempt to shape US negotiating positions toward maximalist demands that Iran cannot realistically accept, while also using military pressure in Lebanon and elsewhere to destabilise the broader diplomatic environment.
That said, the Israeli leadership has no choice but to balance confrontation with Tel Aviv’s dependence on Washington, particularly if Trump ultimately decides that a deal with Tehran serves his own interests.
It would be naïve to dismiss the role of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington. Borzou Daragahi, a longtime Middle East correspondent and founder of Badlands (a newsletter and podcast about global affairs), believes that this lobby is the “main stumbling block” to a diplomatic breakthrough between the United States and Iran.
“The Israel lobby has gotten its tenterhooks into the administration. It has triggered the war that it has long dreamed of. It’s going to be very hard to get them to back down and to rein in their shills. They smell blood, and they are on the attack. Making them even more desperate is the prospect of a surge of anti-Israel political sentiment across the United States in both major parties,” he told TNA.
“Many realise that there’s going to be a size shift, so they’re trying to desperately and aggressively do as much damage and accomplish as many goals in the Middle East as they can under the Trump administration,” noted Daragahi.
Lebanon and the dangers of continued regional conflict
Even if Washington and Tehran reach a diplomatic understanding, violence may continue plaguing parts of the region, particularly Lebanon, which is the most likely arena for ongoing confrontation between Israel and Iran’s regional network of allies.
Israel is unlikely to scale back military operations against Hezbollah and may instead intensify pressure to preserve deterrence and constrain Iran’s influence after any agreement.
“If Washington and Tehran reach a diplomatic agreement, [the Israelis] will not take it gladly. They will first try to torpedo the agreement, and then, if Trump insists on signing a deal with the Iranians, the Israelis will try to make sure that it does not include Lebanon. They have already managed to get [Secretary of State] Marco Rubio to say that Israel will reserve the right to defend itself, the usual formula,” said Dr Bitar.
“But we all know that Israel has an elastic and extraordinarily extensive definition of this right to defend itself. So, Lebanon could be the key victim because it’s unlikely that we will see a ceasefire in Lebanon, and it’s even more unlikely that Israel will put an end to this new invasion and this occupation that is growing day after day, and they are bombing way beyond the so-called yellow zone,” he added.
The limits of the Abraham Accords
Trump’s focus on expanding the Abraham Accords – highlighted by his recent call on countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Qatar to normalise relations with Israel – as part of a broader realignment against Iran, remains central to his Middle East agenda. However, this objective is out of touch with political realities in these countries.
“This is totally unrealistic and [Trump is] easily delusional in believing that this is possible or it’s the kind of demand that Netanyahu would want him to make only in order to undermine any negotiations,” according to Dr Parsi.
“I think it’s delusional, but certainly an effort by Trump to both mitigate some criticism of the proposed MoU even from his own party…but also to try to gain some favour from the Israeli side,” Hooman Majd, an Iranian-American author, journalist, and NBC News contributor, told TNA.
“Of course, the Israelis know full well that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan will not sign on to the Abraham Accords, but Trump is unlikely to have thought that through.”
Can Trump sell a new deal as a victory?
A key question is, could Trump successfully present any potential new agreement to the American public as superior to the 2015 JCPOA?
He will likely emphasise the military weakening of Iran following the war, portraying any agreement as occurring from a position of overwhelming American strength rather than diplomatic compromise.
The administration may also highlight longer sunset clauses, stricter enforcement mechanisms, or temporary enrichment suspensions as evidence that it extracted tougher concessions than Obama did in 2015.
But if Iran retains enrichment rights and receives sanctions relief, it may be difficult for Trump to convince the US public at large that any such new agreement fundamentally differs from the JCPOA.
“Front-loading asset unfreezes in the billions will be very hard for Trump to argue is a ‘win’ for him and the US,” explained Majd. He observed that “the administration knows that it will be attacked left, right and centre for giving Iran access to its monetary resources when Trump has consistently called Obama’s release of funds a gift to the Iranian regime”.
In America’s political environment, public perceptions of the deal may ultimately depend less on its technical details than on partisan loyalties and competing narratives about the war itself.
“I think he could sell it to some of his supporters, maybe 30 percent of the electorate. I think no matter what he does, the US is so polarised the Democrats will see it as much worse than what Obama accomplished and much more expensive,” said Daragahi.
Diplomacy without resolution
Ultimately, diplomacy between Washington and Tehran remains possible. However, it is unlikely to produce a definitive resolution to the broader regional struggle. Underlying sources of tension – mutual distrust, competing security doctrines, unresolved proxy conflicts, and conflicting visions of regional order – will remain firmly intact, even if an MoU is reached.
Such an agreement may institutionalise a fragile balance in which the serious risk of confrontation is managed, not eliminated. Iran appears determined to preserve the leverage it accumulated during and after the war. Israel remains deeply sceptical of accommodation. Regional powers are increasingly pursuing independent agendas in a new geopolitical environment.
It is safe to say that any agreement reached in the upcoming period will likely reflect a temporary convergence of interests between adversaries who continue to fundamentally distrust one another, rather than reconciliation.
In this context, diplomacy stands a chance of reducing the risk of immediate war, albeit without resolving the underlying forces driving regional instability.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics
Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero
Edited by Charlie Hoyle
